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CASE NOTES
dry ice would explode, the lack of such knowledge will not preclude a
finding of negligence. 12 The Ratai and Tidwell cases, in holding that dry
ice is a dangerous substance, appear to follow more closely the standards
of tort liability and negligence evidenced by numerous American de-
cisions.
12 LeJeune v. General Petroleum Co., 13 P.2d 1057 (1932); Easier v. Downie Amuse-
ment Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 Ad. 905 (1926).
REAL PROPERTY-WIDOW NOT ENTITLED TO CON-
TRIBUTION FOR MORTGAGE OF PROPERTY
HELD BY THE ENTIRETIES
Aaron Keil and his wife Ada Keil acquired property as tenants by the
entirety in 1954. In April 1956 Aaron and his wife borrowed $8,000 to be
used to improve the land. This debt was evidenced by a joint bond pay-
able in five years and secured by a mortgage on the property. Aaron died
in August 1956 and at the time of his death nothing had been paid on the
debt. The estate proceedings took place in the Orphan's Court of New
Castle County, Delaware. The widow contended that (1) the will evi-
denced an intention to exonerate her from all liability on the debt; and (2)
if not entitled to be fully exonerated, she had a right to contribution for
one half the debt. The widow was denied relief on both grounds, and ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware, renewing both contentions.
The Supreme Court also denied the first contention but affirmed the right
of the widow to contribution for one half of the $8,000 debt. In re Keil's
Estate, 145 A 2d 563 (Del., 1958).
The question before the court was: If a husband and wife jointly incur
a debt which is secured by a mortgage on property held by them as tenants
by the entirety, and one spouse dies, does the surviving spouse have a
right of contribution of one half the common debt from the estate of the
decedent?
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in settling this issue for the first time
in its history, passed upon a question of which there is much disagreement
in the various courts of this country. The basis for reversing the lower
court's decision was that the right of contribution exists independently of
the interest each tenant has in the property. Therefore the survivorship
feature of tenancy by the entirety in no way affects the right of con-
tribution of one half the common debt claimed by the surviving spouse.
The leading case in support of this position is Cunningham v. Cunning-
ham,' which involved the right of contribution by the widow out of the
deceased husband's estate for a proportionate share of a purchase money
mortgage indebtedness. The court upheld the widow's claim, saying that
1 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930).
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in the absence of proof rebutting the presumption of equal liability of
husband and wife as principals, they are co-principals. "As between Joint
and Equal Principals, the right of proportionate contribution exists, and
that right is assertable against the estate of a deceased co-principal." 2
The rationale of such a decision is based on principles of equity. Since
the payment of the debt is for the benefit of both joint obligors, the one
discharging the whole obligation is entitled to contribution from the
other. 3 It is emphasized in the principal case that the indebtedness of the
deceased estate to the mortgagee is not affected, but that the question of
contribution is between the joint obligors only.4
The opinion in the Keil case ignores the fact that the deceased and the
appellant were tenants by the entirety of the property in question. Tenan-
cy by entirety rests on the common law concept of spousal unity. That
unity terminates upon the death of either one of the co-tenants. Each is
seised of the whole. Hence death of one spouse causes no enlargement or
change in the estate of the surviving spouse. The spouse which survives
always owned the whole.5 Thus upon death of either spouse the estate of
the deceased spouse becomes divested of any interest in the property and
to compel contribution would be to have the estate pay part of a debt on
property in which the estate has no interest.6
The basis of contribution is equality, each co-tenant contributing a pro-
portionate share of the indebtedness. The American Law of Property
supports this position by saying "Each stands in the same situation in his
relation to the property, and reason and justice as administered by equity
require that each pay a proportionate share of the burden."' 7 However as
mentioned above each of the co-tenants in the principal case do not stand
in the same situation in relation to the property. The deceased is complete-
ly divested of his interest. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution in
supporting the right of contribution among co-tenants explains that the
tenant who satisfies the debt has protected the interest of the other co-
obligor.8 In the case before us there is no interest to protect.
2 Ibid., at 374, 447. See In re Dowlers Estate 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); Brady v.
Brady, 110 Md. 656, 73 Ad. 567 (1909).
8 In re Kershaws Estate, 352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945); Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N.J.
Eq. 119, 156 Ad. 483 (1931); Long Estate, 65 Pa. District & County 95 (1949); Com-
merce Union Bank v. Weis, 27 Tenn. App. 433, 181 S.W.2d 764 (1944).
4 13 Am. Juris. Contribution, S 60, p. 55.
5 Powell, Real Property, Vol. 4, Sec. 624 (1958).
6 Lopez v. Lopez, 90 S.2d 456 (Fla. 1956); In re Dowlers Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d
211 (1951); Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 169, 156 N.E. 870 (1927); Geldart v. Bank of New
York, 209 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y.S. 238 (1924).
7American Law of Property, Vol. 2, Sec. 6.12 (1952).
8 Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Sec. 85, p. 377 (1937).
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The joint debt which Aaron and Ada Keil incurred was $8,000. Assum-
ing the property to be worth $20,000 each had an equity of $12,000, since
as tenants by the entirety they were both seised of the whole. To allow
contribution of $4,000 to Ada Keil would give her an equiy of $16,000. If
she were to pay the whole debt her equity would remain $12,000. Thus
when her husband died Ada Keil suffered no detriment. In addition the
$8,000 was used for improvements to the land of which she is now sole
owner. It therefore seems inequitable for the estate of a deceased tenant by
the entireties.9
9 Tenancy by the entirety is not a recognized type of property holding in Illinois.
See Douds v. Fresen, 392 Il. 478, 64 N.E.2d 729 (1946); Lawler v. Byrne, 252 111. 194, 96
N.E. 892 (1911). Non-recognition of tenancy in the Married Woman's Act of 1861,
Laws 1861, p. 143.
TAXATION-UNION STRIKE BENEFITS HELD NOT TO
CONSTITUTE INCOME UNDER INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
Plaintiff brought suit to recover taxes imposed by the Commissioner
upon strike benefits received from the United Automobile Workers dur-
ing the early stages of the now famous Kohler strike. At the trial,' the pre-
siding judge reserved ruling on the Commissioner's motion for a directed
verdict and submitted the case to the jury for a determination of whether
the payments in question constituted a gift. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the taxpayer on this issue, whereupon the judge set aside the ver-
dict and granted the Commissioner's motion for a directed verdict. On
appeal, the court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
strike benefits do not constitute income within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. 2 In addition, the court held that the particular receipts in-
volved in this case were gifts and, therefore, expressly exempted from tax-
ation by Section 102 of the Code.3 Kaiser v. United States, 267 F.2d 367
(C.A. 7th, 1958).
One of the most perplexing problems in the interpretation of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, taxability of strike benefits, is presented by the instant
case. This decision raises serious questions of law and policy which doubt-
less will not be put to final rest unless and until the Supreme Court takes
the case.
1 The proceedings in the district court are reported in Kaiser v. United States, 158
F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis., 1958).
2The definition of gross income set forth in Section 61(a) is pivotal to all the in-
come tax provisions in the Code. Only those receipts which are encompassed within this
definition are subject to taxation.
3 Section 102 (a) provides: "Gross income does not include the value of property ac-
quired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
